Inside the royal blue waters

WHEN THE lights went out in the port of Asab, just inside the royal blue waters of the narrow Bab al Mandah, Comrade Mengistu Haile Mariam, clucking his tongue in increasing agitation, could feel the noose tightening around his neck some 200 miles to the southwest in Addis Ababa.
The disturbing report from the pock-marked white-washed government command post on Monday morning, April 15, 1991 indicated the rebels had used standard guerilla tactics of cutting the powerlines, causing a complete blackout, in preparation of a full-scale assault on the strategic Red Sea harbor.
Asab, the only port fully in government hands, was the country's lifeline for exports and imports, including emergency food for millions and site of Ethiopia's only oil refinery.
Descended in a direct line from an ancient Sabean anchorage, Asab owed its name to the Greeks and Romans, who dubbed it Berenike-ad-Saba (Bernice-near Saba).

Before Febriary 1990, the Eritrean rebels were long-time irritants with limited weaponry, except for dozens of captured Soviet T-54 and T-55 tanks and a stockpile of rusting 20-millimeter anti-aircraft guns, however, when the northern Red Sea port of Massawa in the province of Eritrea fell into their hands, they created a mystique of invincibility and also collected a major portion of the Ethiopian navy, which included two frigates and 20 smaller vessels.
The takeover of Massawa and the eventual fall of Asab by the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), would effectively landlock the government, and add momentum to their march to Addis with their message of contempt for the dictator.
These recessionists, who fought for Eritrea's independence, had forged an uneasy alliance with the central Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), formerly the Tigre People's Revolutionary Liberation Front. The EPRDF, in turn, was a merger of four dissident groups fighting to overthrow Mengistu and establish a broad-based administration.
The malcontents, however, still faced overwhelming odds, for the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies claimed Mengistu's armed forces numbered 483,000, including 200,000 people's militia, with the conscripted army boasting 31 infantry divisions, 32 tank, 40 artillery and 12 air defence battalions. His airforce flew 120 MiG-21s and MiG-23s, 16 transport planes and 20 Mi24 attack helicopters. The EPLF side numbered 40,000-50,000 regulars and 30,000 militia; the EPRDF's (the Tigreans) strength was 30,000-40,000 regulars; plus 7,000 from the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF).
While outmanned and definitely outgunned, the rebels were fully aware of the Ethiopian government forces' reputation for ineptness. Poorly trained, with the exception of its airforce, there was a definite lack of discipline even among their leaders with reports of desertion an everyday occurrence.
Tactics,however, appeared to be their Achilles' heel and the blame often fell at the doorstep of military strategist, Defence Minister Lt. Gen. Gebre Kedan, previously commander of the First Military Zone, in Eritrea.
It was particularly pronounced when hundreds of tanks were ordered into the Simien Mountains of northern Ethiopia, in an attempt to overrun enemy strongholds. Instead of completing their mission, Ethiopian tank commanders found themselves trapped in steaming metal compartments on narrow, twisting and, often death-defying, mountain paths.

Stephen Mengesha: The confiscation of these tanks was accomplished with relative ease as a guerilla fighter would climb atop the lead tank; lift the cover and throw a boulder inside, damaging the vehicle's operation. The stalled tank would create a roadblock for the trailing tank column. The rebels, fully realizing the tanks had no reverse gear and wouldn't be able to turn around on the paths, played a waiting game for the Ethiopians to surrender. Since none carried any more than two days' rations, surrendering seemed more feasible than frying to death. The rebels were also quick to take advantage of the situation by giving these tank drivers three weeks of training and then ordering them back into their own tanks and forcing them, at gunpoint, to fire on their own government troops.

Mengistu and his henchmen also made another in a litany of tactical errors by burning village after village and killing their inhabitants, believing it would prevent the guerillas from occupying them. The survivors' hatred for the Addis Ababa government grew in intensity.